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Abstract
 Contemporary China-Africa agricultural cooperation 
(CAAC) has been internally dominated by three streams 
of narrative: promotion of food security for state building 
in the post-war landscape; productivity enhancement 
through technocratic modernisation; and promotion of 
aid sustainability through business engagement in the 
new era of globalisation. This paper explores the domestic 
drivers and strategies underpinning these narratives, as 
well as their respective implications for CAAC, using a 
historical review approach. The paper summarises three 
elements entrenched in the narratives of CAAC – state 
leadership, productivity-centrism and the government-
business nexus – which are examples of travelling 
technocratic rationality. These differentiate China’s aid, 
focusing on developmental state building, from the 
established aid consensus, with its marriage of orthodox 
neoliberalism and a new institutionalism. 
Key Words: China, Africa, narrative, historical review, 
agricultural cooperation
Contemporary China-Africa agricultural cooperation 
(CAAC) has been internally dominated by discourses of 
‘improving Africa’s food security via prioritising its 
independent agricultural development’; ‘enhancing 
productivity via technological improvement’; as well as 
‘ensuring aid sustainability via business engagement’. 
These three strands of discourse are scattered throughout 
policy documents and in the public media, and were 
typically articulated by Mr. Han Changfu, Chinese 
Agriculture Minister, in his vision for the future of CAAC 
at the first China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Forum 
in 2010: ‘compassing food security, we will fully explore 
new areas for CAAC; strengthening technological 
communication and cooperation to improve Africa’s self-
development capacities; and promoting trade and 
investment with stronger policy support’ (Cen 2010). The 
three streams of framing highlight China’s perspectives 
on its agricultural overseas engagement, particularly with 
African countries. They are not necessarily logically self-
consistent, single-layered or static. Rather, their 
effectiveness is to be tested in the future; their 
connotations are shaped by different stakeholders at 
various levels; and above all they are dynamic, having 
originated from China’s own agricultural development 
experiences with a long historical process of adjustment 
through trial and error.
However, the aforementioned narratives and their 
associated logic that originated from China’s internal 
agrarian transformation experiences have long been 
concealed or invisible in the international debates on 
CAAC. The prevailing approaches in the international 
media, academic and policy circles are exploring the 
histories and modalities of the cooperation (Alden 2013; 
Buckley 2013; Bräutigam and Tang 2009; Spring 2009); 
examining its mechanisms and approaches (Xu et al. 
2014; Buckley 2013; Scoones et al. 2013; Yan and Sautman 
2010); and discussing the impacts of the engagement, 
particularly related to the concerns of land and resource 
grabs or ‘neo-colonialism’ (Bräutigam and Zhang 2013; 
Cotula et al. 2009; Spring 2009). These inquiries have not 
yet linked China’s domestic rural modernisation 
experiences and discourses strongly enough to its current 
overseas engagement to reveal what elements of China’s 
agricultural development have travelled to African 
countries, and what is the nature and significance of the 
travelling elements. 
This paper thus provides the Chinese side of the CAAC 
story to make the invisible narratives and associated 
inherent logic generated and evolved in China’s context 
visible in the international discussion. It examines what 
has historically driven agricultural development in China 
through different periods; what the narratives have been; 
and how these narratives with their associated political 
ideologies, interests and images of the Chinese state have 
been built into its development cooperation efforts both 
explicitly and implicitly. It brings in a rich and critical 
analysis of changing interests, politics and state ideology 
in relation to agriculture, both at home and abroad. The 
exercise reveals Chinese perspectives and concerns on 
agriculture, China-Africa relations, the global system and 
globalisation, business and the market economy, as well 
as the government’s role in development. 
Promoting Food Security for 
State Building in the Post-War 
Landscape
Unpacking the narrative
Promoting Africa’s food security and independent 
agricultural development have been reiterated as the 
ultimate goal of CAAC, described as ‘teaching a man to 
fish rather than giving him fish’ (授人以鱼不如授人以
渔) (Han, 2010) by China’s Agriculture Minister (Han 2010. 
According to a 2010 White Paper on CAAC, ‘The 
fundamental goal of CAAC is to support African countries 
to improve their food security as it involves the national 
stability and poverty reduction’ (Pan and Liu, 2010; China 
State Council 2010). The high level of these narratives 
discloses how China views the importance of food 
security as well as the significance of independent 
agricultural development in Africa’s development 
process. 
The nature of the food security and self-independence 
narrative has actually penetrated China’s internal 
agricultural development histories since its early state 
building process in the post-World War II politico-
economic landscape, although with variations in different 
stages. For example, in Mao’s era the narrative was 
embodied as ‘the principle of ensuring food security via 
grain self-production needs to be the top priority of the 
development strategy’ and this principle ‘should never 
be slackened’ (决不放松) (Wang 2009); in Deng’s era as 
‘whoever has food has everything’ (谁有了粮食，谁就
有了一切)(Deng 1989:78); in Jiang’s era as ‘keep close 
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attention on food security as always’ (始终抓得很紧很
紧)(Jiang, 1998); in Hu’s era as ‘the food issue is always a 
top priority’ (粮食问题始终是头等大事)(Hu, 2008); and 
in Xi’s era as ‘the heart is at peace if there is food in the 
hands’ (手中有粮，心中不慌)(Xi 2013). The last of these 
was actually coined by Mao in 1959, but revived in the 
new era to emphasise the importance of food security. 
The narrative continues as ‘food is the paramount 
necessity of the people’ (民以食为天) and ‘the country 
is based on agriculture’ (农业立国), both of which 
permeate China’s agricultural development policies.
With this narrative, agriculture was basically perceived 
as a source of food, capital and material for national 
industrialisation and modernisation. In other words, 
agriculture was primarily reduced to a source of food 
and industrialisation. This process of prioritisation and 
simplification was best represented in Mao’s narrative 
of transforming goals from ‘building up the family 
fortune’ (发家致富 ) to ‘enhancing productivity in 
patriotism’ (爱国增产) after the land reform in 1951. Said 
Mao, 
We cannot simply tell farmers to make fortune. 
Alternatively, we need to repeatedly explain to them 
that their efforts should contribute to building the 
nation as a foundation. To achieve this goal, the 
productivity of staple food needs to be improved; 
the material for industry has to be increased; and 
the export goods need to be enhanced for more 
capital accumulation. Once the nation fulfils 
industrialisation, it can in return improve the 
all-around agricultural production and improve 
farmers’ livelihoods (in Bo 1951).
This logic was inherited down to the present day in 
the form of a strong emphasis on national food security 
for both China and African countries participating in 
CAAC.
Drivers behind the narrative
The core of China’s agricultural development policy, 
particularly in Mao’s era, was to ensure national food 
security and the primitive accumulation of 
industrialisation. The drivers underpinning this 
perception of agriculture in China originated from both 
historical experiences and evaluation of the post-war 
politico-economic global context, within which it was 
deemed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and 
Chinese central government to be a basic approach to 
maintain its sovereignty and self-determination after the 
establishment of New China in 1949. 
As  an ancient agricultural country, China had suffered 
several periods of hunger and famine since the Tang 
Dynasty (618-917) resulting from the identified basic 
national condition (基本国情), ‘big population with 
limited lands’ (人多地少). These were further aggravated 
in the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and fully erupted with 
the invasion of the Western powers from the 1840s. 
Twelve million people suffered from the famine of 1928 
resulting from drought, while floods that followed in 1931 
led to millions of people losing their homes and many 
deaths (Wu and Zheng 2004: 79). Anti-imperialist wars 
against Western powers and Japan, along with the 
subsequent civil war, destroyed agricultural production, 
and food security became a serious challenge to a broken 
China. In this context, both Sun Yat-sen, the founder of 
the Kuomintang, and Mao Zedong, the leader of the CPC, 
paid high attention to the issue of ‘feeding’ (吃饭问题), 
and regarded solving the hunger problem as the 
foundation of their governing legitimacy in the modern 
state building process.
Meanwhile, when facing New China’s fragile and weak 
state of ‘poverty and blankness’ (一穷二白 ) , 
industrialisation was deemed as the overwhelming 
dream for Chinese leaders and ordinary people. Mao 
summarised the hundred years of painful historical 
lessons leading up to 1944 thus: ‘The reason for China’s 
backwardness is that we have not been industrialised.... 
therefore, to eliminate the backwardness is the task for 
the whole nation.’ (Wu and Zheng 2004: 459). After the 
birth of New China, Mao sighed, ‘what can we make now? 
We can make tables and chairs, tea pots and bowls. We 
can produce grains, and grind them into flour. We can 
also make papers. But we can not make even one car, 
one plane, one tank or one tractor’ (Mao 1999: 329). Based 
on the path of ‘encircling the cities from rural areas’ (农
村包围城市) taken by the CPC for its success in the civil 
war, Mao once again turned to farmers for accumulating 
the funds for the whole nation’s industrialisation. Mao 
stipulated, ‘the Revolution could only win the victory with 
the aid of farmers, and the industrialisation of the state 
can only be possible to succeed with the aid of farmers 
again’(Mao,1950).
Strategies underpinning the narrative
During this period, on the one hand, the CPC and the 
State Council took a series of measures to maintain the 
minimum food security with a mono-agricultural strategy 
concentrating on food crops, though interrupted by 
natural disasters and political struggles during the 1950s-
70s. The land reforms, firstly privatised to small farmers 
in the early 1950s, and then collectivised in the commune 
system in the late 1950s, were also accompanied by a 
series of policies which saw the collective mobilisation 
of labour in small-scale irrigation system construction, 
establishment of agricultural universities, the 
development of national and local research institutions 
and the development of agro-input industries. These 
initiatives led to an increase in agricultural production, 
particularly in food crops (Li et al. 2012: 35). The output 
of food crops increased almost 2.7 times between 1949 
and 1978 and average output of food crops per capita 
went from 208kg to 299kg during 1949-1958 (NBSC 2009: 
161, 637). 
On the other hand, following the principle of ‘taking 
agriculture as the base, and industry as the lead’ (农业
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为基础，工业为主导), a rigid system of central control 
and command was established characterised by two 
typical sub-systems: ‘the state monopoly for purchase 
and marketing’ (统购统销), and ‘the urban-rural dual 
structure’ (城乡二元结构) maintained by the residence 
registration system  (户口). Under the governing system, 
farmers were strictly fixed on the land in people’s 
communes (人民公社) which mobilised all the production 
factors for collective farming. The surplus generated by 
the communes was transferred to the industrial sector 
via the mechanism of ‘price scissors’ (剪刀差), which 
lowered the prices of agricultural products and increased 
the prices of industrial ones. According to the calculations 
of Feng and Li (1993), from 1952 to 1990 China’s 
agriculture provided a total of 1.1594 trillion RMB of 
capital for industrialisation. They believe that about 1/3 
of the national income in China’s industrialisation process 
came from agriculture, fully indicating the important role 
of agriculture in the capital accumulation for China’s 
industrialisation. 
Implications for CAAC
Overall, particularly in China’s early development 
period before the reform, agriculture has been taken as 
the base of the national economy by both ensuring basic 
food security and by accumulating capital for 
industrialisation. This became embedded in China’s 
domestic politico-economic context in Mao’s era: the 
approach was chosen by the CPC based on their early 
revolutionary experiences, and was able to operate with 
the strong and pervasive mobilisation capacity of 
nationalism developed over 100 years of trial and error 
for competing with the Western powers, as well as with 
the support of the rigid, systematic and highly political 
governing architecture. Ensuring food sovereignty and 
agriculture-based industrialisation were deemed basic 
and compulsory components in China’s catching-up 
strategy and in strengthening state building in the global 
system after the war. With collective farming, the 
commune system, the planning economy and the 
centralised political system ran for almost 30 years before 
going fully bankrupt at the end of the 1970s. 
Not surprisingly, the ideology of nation building via 
food self-sufficiency travelled to African countries during 
the period of CAAC in Mao’s era. China emphasised state 
building and endeavoured for sovereignty and self-
determination on both sides in setting its aid goals. 
African countries and China have been in ‘a community 
of shared destines’(Xi 2013) since their early 
independence. As members of the Third World or the 
global South, China spared no efforts to provide foreign 
aid, even beyond its own capability, to African countries’ 
anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist efforts. This was to fulfil 
its international responsibilities on the one hand; and to 
enhance its legitimate identity as an independent 
country, and help to create an enabling environment for 
its own national economic development after its political 
independence, on the other. The motivations behind the 
aid in this period can be summarised as a combination 
of internationalism (国际主义) and patriotism (爱国主
义) (Zhou 2008). Food self-sufficiency is perceived on 
China’s side to be the key contribution to the nation 
building of African countries.
Accordingly, the aid modality during this period 
focused more on large state farms, which were believed 
to be an effective way to mobilise resources to attain 
food self-reliance and to promote industrialisation in the 
host countries. For example, the Chinese government 
announced they would contribute to the development 
of African countries in achieving ‘self-dependence’ to 
solve the food insecurity problem in ‘taking over’ aid from 
Taiwan during the 1970s (Jiang 2013). Forms of collective 
farming such as Dazhai (大寨), salient in domestic China 
as well during the socialist period, were practiced in 
African countries. Through working shoulder to shoulder 
with locals, Chinese agricultural aid workers and experts 
presented the Dazhai spirit of hard work, perseverance, 
self-dependence, equality and collectivism.
Productivity Enhancement in 
Technocratic Modernisation 
Unpacking the narrative
Science and technology (S&T) has been deemed as 
one key to China’s economic miracle and a recipe to help 
African countries to step out of ‘Agro-Afro-pessimism’ by 
both Chinese side, African counterparts, as well as the 
international community in the new era. The newly 
revived endeavor on African agricultural development 
such as the Millennium Village Project and the 
Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development 
Program (CAADP) aims to stimulate African green 
revolution. China’s success in ‘feeding more than 20 
percent of world population with less than 10 percent 
of the world’s arable land and one fourth of world per 
capita water availability’ (Huang and Hu, 2004) creates 
greatest momentum for China sharing development 
experiences on productivity improvement via technology 
with African countries in CAAC. 
Looking inside, productivity enhancement via 
technology improvement has been one of major secrets 
about China’s internal agricultural development 
embedded within a broader technocratic modernisation 
trajectory particularly since the reform and open-door 
policy initiated in Deng’s era. The importance of modern 
technology in agricultural development is best 
represented by Deng’s narrative, ‘the development of 
agriculture relies firstly on policy, and secondly on S&T...
but the solutions ultimately rely on science’ (农业的发
展，一靠政策，二靠科技……但最终要靠科学解决问
题 ). He continued his doctrine of technology-
development nexus by arguing that ‘S&T is the No. 1 
productive force’ (科技是第一生产力) in 1988, and then 
‘invigorating agriculture by relying on S&T, and education’ 
(科教兴农) in 1991. The technocratic rationality has been 
consummated when the S&T-centered development 
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ideology has been entrenched into the nation building 
priority by announcing ‘rejuvenating the nation by 
relying on S&T and education’ (科教兴国) in 1995. 
With the narrative, agriculture S&T has been perceived 
to be the top one engine for agricultural modernisation. 
Since the Reform and Open-door Policy initiated in the 
end of 1970s, a faith in the ability to transform the 
countryside through application of S&T underlies China’s 
agricultural and rural development discourses and 
policies. This faith and ideology, i.e. scientific agriculture 
(科学种田), is the systematic application of scientific 
techniques to improve agricultural productivity, 
including new seed strains, land management systems, 
cropping techniques, as well as fertilisers, pesticides and 
irrigation systems. The pragmatic nature of the S&T 
narrative also constructs one of the key elements of 
Deng’s reform ideology, ‘seeking truth from the facts’ (
实事求是), which focuses on the instrumental and 
economic side of the development approach while 
abandoning the debates on political ideology. China’s 
agricultural development started a depoliticised process 
of expansion of technocratic rationality within the broad 
modernisation context of catching up.
Drivers behind the narrative
The narrative of productivity enhancement via S&T 
can be traced back to China’s ancient intensive cultivation 
system, which included breeding, land use, cropping 
systems, tools and fertilisation along with corresponding 
governing systems, social values and knowledge 
accumulation via books and publications. The tradition 
of agrotechnique production and extension was further 
strengthened with the introduction of Western 
agricultural S&T along with its own governing system 
due to the ‘backwardness’ of Chinese traditional farming 
practices in the Qing Dynasty (1616-1912). ‘Science’, later 
being translated into ‘technology’, coupled with 
pragmatic and evolutionary ideology, was regarded as 
one of the principal recipes for China’s modernisation 
against the Western powers. 
Aside from its historical legacy, the ideology of 
technocratic development has been formally ingrained 
in China’s reform process due to the difficult realities prior 
to the reform at the end of the 1970s. China’s agricultural 
development had long stagnated. Almost 80 percent of 
the population were stuck in absolute poverty, rural 
income per capita was only 63.34 RMB, and grain output 
per capita was under 300kg (Li et al. 2012: 54). According 
to data from the World Bank (1982: 21), China’s share of 
global GNP in 1980 was reduced to almost half of that 
in 1949 after thirty years of development. The GNP per 
capita in China in 1980 lagged even farther behind that 
in 1949. This is what led Deng (1978) to comment on the 
realities by the end of the 1970s by saying, ‘our country 
will be dismissed from the Earth if we do not reform now’ 
to change the grievous and nearly bankrupt situation. 
Learning from Western S&T, which started in the late Qing 
Dynasty and was disrupted in Mao’s era, once again 
became the key instrument for the reform.
 
Strategies underpinning the narrative
The strategies underpinning the second narrative 
include both ‘soft technology’ transformation and ‘hard 
technology’ promotion since the reform. During the end 
of the 1970s and early 1980s, intensive field investigations 
were carried out by Deng’s team which confirmed the 
seriousness of the poverty issue and revealed the deep 
crisis of the strict control and command system in 
mobilising the incentives of neither farmers nor local 
governments. In Deng’s visit to Guangdong Province in 
1977, he stressed the importance of the policy and gave 
space for innovation to the local governments by saying, 
‘you can start if you think it is effective. You do not need 
to wait for central permission’ (Deng 1977 in Deng 2004). 
Eighteen farmers in Xiaogang Village, Anhui Province 
quickly initiated a bottom-up reform to distribute their 
collective lands to households on contracts in the spring 
of 1978, even under risk of death, seeming to respond 
to Deng’s openness. With the local and central 
governments’ strategy of ‘keeping one eye open and one 
eye closed’ (睁一只眼，闭一只眼), this small and furtive 
trial was later silently but quickly extended to other areas 
and thus triggered the famous Household Responsibility 
System (家庭联产承包责任制) policy, which was later 
perceived to be the commence of the Reform Policy in 
Deng’s era. 
The above mode of trial, farmer-government 
interaction and learning characterised China’s agrarian 
transformation process, including the fertiliser market 
liberalisation, emergence of Township and Village 
Enterprises (乡镇企业), grain market reforms, etc. are all 
‘surprises’ arising partly from the bottom, and endorsed 
finally by the upper level of decision-makers. This process 
was articulated by Deng as ‘feeling our way across the 
river’ (摸着石头过河), coupled with the intellectual 
approach of ‘seeking truth from facts’ (实事求是), 
indicating that no blueprint was available for the reforms 
in the initial stage, but these more depended on a 
pragmatic approach of continual learning from trial and 
error. 
Intertwined with the ‘soft technology’ development 
trajectory, i.e. the institutional transformations described 
above, the development of ‘hard’ agricultural technology 
was also well instigated and enhanced. Deng’s initial step 
was to reverse the public bias against scientists in the 
Cultural Revolution of Mao’s era, when the research and 
extension system was destroyed by sending all the 
researchers and intellectual elites to the rural areas to 
‘learn or regain education from the middle and poor 
farmers’ (接受贫下中农再教育). Since the reform, the 
social status, income and opportunities in capacity 
development of agricultural researchers and extensionists 
were enhanced, and the importance of their technologies 
was stressed officially. Accordingly, China has invested 
vigorously in the agricultural research and extension 
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system, particularly during the 1970s-1980s, resulting in 
the biggest research team in the world in terms of staff 
members by 1999 (Huang 2002). Various specific research 
and extension programs and projects were initiated in 
the 1980s such as the Spark Program (星火计划) by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology in 1986 to stimulate 
the appropriate agricultural technology extension in rural 
areas; the Harvest Plan (丰收计划) by the Ministry of 
Agriculture in 1987 to promote advanced high-
productivity and high-quality technology extension to 
improve agricultural economic, social and environmental 
impacts; and the Prairie Fire Plan (燎原计划) by the 
Ministry of Education in 1988 to provide training services 
to farmers to enhance their capacities in technology 
adoption (Xu 2004). 
The growth rate of China’s investment in agricultural 
research was 4.86 percent during the period of 1981-
2000, while the global average was only 2.11 percent, 
and the average rate in developing countries was 3.14 
percent (Pardey et al. 2006). World Bank (2008: 65) data 
shows that in the past two decades, China’s investment 
in agricultural R&D increased nearly twofold. Chinese 
scientists developed hybrid rice in the early 1970s and 
a number of successful varieties in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The contribution of agricultural S&T to agricultural 
growth gradually increased, reaching up to 40 percent 
(Zhu 1997: 135). Accordingly, at the micro level, inputs 
of chemical fertilisers, agricultural machinery and 
improved seeds became a large share of family expenses 
for small rural households, a trend which started with 
the Household Responsibility System. 
Implications for CAAC
The endeavour of transferring China’s agricultural 
technologies to African countries was initiated in the 
end of the 1950s, and intensified as a return gift to African 
countries during the 1970s and 1980s due to diplomacy 
competition with Taiwan (Bräutigam and Tang 2009). 
Since the 1980s, technology transfer has gained new 
momentum in CAAC. China’s ideology of technical 
solutions to African agricultural development has been 
gradually established. African agriculture has much 
potential for development with its endowment of rich 
resources and 60 percent of Africans working in 
agriculture. However, so far Africa is still the only net 
food-importing continent in the world. Low productivity 
has been perceived to be the main pitfall of African 
agricultural development. Therefore, technology transfer 
has been set as one of the key elements of CAAC. 
In the 1980s, CAAC adopted the principle of ‘being 
responsible to the end’ (负责到底) with the consolidation 
or rehabilitation of the dozens of former aid projects that 
had collapsed or were barely limping along. This was 
joined with the guideline of ‘making the best efforts and 
acting on capacity’ (尽力而为，量力而行). Delivering 
aid for human resource development and technology 
transfer was an interpretation of Chinese perspectives 
on aid sustainability, as were approaches to how to 
achieve that delivery with limited resources in the 
transitional context. 
Principally, the role of technology transfer in CAAC 
during that period needs to be understood within the 
broad political-economic context of domestic China at 
the time. In Deng’s period, differing from the large budget 
of aid in Mao’s time, which peaked at 6.92 percent of 
total government expenditures (Zhou 2009), the 
guidance of ‘doing more with less’ (花小钱办大事) in aid 
was adopted. The major efforts were put into domestic 
economic development. Thus the limited aid resources 
would pursue the best results by decentralising and 
rationalising the aid governance structure; inviting 
African co-funding, particularly in local operations; and 
promoting the participation of China’s companies and 
banks in CAAC.
Accordingly, the aid modality has been redefined. The 
technical aid though an apprentice system (师傅带徒
弟), particularly in the rehabilitation programs, was 
greatly highlighted as it was believed to be more cost-
effective and sustainable (Zhou 2009) and thus ensure 
‘the real benefits of the local people’ (真正使当地人受
益). During this period, concepts such as ‘turn-key 
projects’ (交钥匙工程), ‘mutual benefits’(互利), ‘teaching 
a man to fish rather than giving him fish’（授人以鱼不
如授人以渔）, as well as ‘combining aid and investment 
with market mechanisms’（投资和援助相结合，引入
市场机制） were first introduced and piloted. The 
effectiveness and quality of aid was stressed in project 
formulation, implementation and management.
In summary, the faith in S&T for solving agricultural 
development pitfalls domestically has been travelling 
to African countries via CAAC for the past 50 years, 
informing the Agricultural Technology Demonstration 
Centres (ATDCs) initiated in the new century. It reflects 
Chinese perceptions of African agricultural development 
solutions. As stated by Wei Jianguo (2011: 232-234), the 
former Minister of Commerce, ‘Why is it that Africa boasts 
such rich resources, but is still plagued with food 
shortage? Because the local farmers lack technology. 
They do not know how to cultivate. So our aid mission 
is to teach them how to produce food.’ These technical 
solutions encountered challenges during the process. 
For instance, the ‘good practices’ of Chinese experts that 
bring high productivity cannot always be sustained after 
the experts depart, and the curse of ‘quick starting, quick 
results and quick decline’ (Yun 2000) recurs in China’s 
agricultural aid to African countries. However, the reasons 
for failure are continuously framed as technical problems 
or attributed to low adaptation capacity by African locals. 
‘The African farmers need a revolution on their mindset 
to accept Chinese technologies,’ concluded Wei (2011: 
226). Hence, consciously or unconsciously, China’s 
evolved agricultural aid policies and practices not only 
deliver specific technologies to the African continent, 
but also transfer a technocratic development ideology. 
This ideology prioritises productivity improvement and 
economic development via technological solutions in 
the development sequence.
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Business Engagement for 
Development Sustainability in 
the New Era of Globalisation
Unpacking the narrative
Since the new century, particularly with the initiation 
of the ATDCs as one of the eight policy instruments of 
China’s aid to African countries at the 2006 Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Beijing, 
CAAC has arrived at a new stage featuring a combination 
of aid and business in public-private partnership (PPP) 
to attain aid sustainability. This comprehensive scheme 
for transnational technology transfer originated from 
China’s internal reform trajectory with its mixture of 
public and private agencies to create sustained 
momentum for development, and it represents a new 
modality for sustainable development in an increasingly 
mutually intertwined landscape of globalisation.
The policy narrative of ‘detaching government 
intervention from enterprise operation’ (政企分开) 
actually originated from the early reform era, indicating 
the deconstruction of highly political mechanisms. It was 
the first step to liberate and foster the economic actors 
from the overweeningly political social organisations in 
Mao’s era. The narrative was fully spread to guide the 
reform process of all the sectors, such as the agricultural 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), state farms and the 
public agricultural research and extension system. The 
reform process, in this sense, is a process of creating 
mutually independent public and private sectors on the 
one hand and promoting cooperation between these 
sectors on the other. 
After three decades of pilot reform processes, a call 
to enhance the determinant role of the market in resource 
allocation came in the Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
Central Committee of CPC in November 2013. Along with 
this the Committee voiced a further call to promote the 
participation of private actors in the reform of China’s 
SOEs for ‘mixture of ownership’ (混合所有制) and 
continue endeavours for cooperation between the public 
and private sectors for a more comprehensive 
development. With a new development ideology 
emerging in China in the new century, including ‘scientific 
development’ (科学发展), ‘establishing a harmonious 
society’ (建设和谐社会) and fulfilling ‘China’s dream’ (中
国梦), the welfare of disadvantaged groups and the 
environmental costs of economic growth have been 
gradually taken into account. The participation of private 
or individual actors in the reform, and their benefits, are 
more often stressed. PPP has thus, to an extent, supported 
the shift in ideology.
Additionally, the third stream of narrative is also related 
to China’s increasingly intertwined engagement in 
globalisation, particularly with the ‘going out’ (走出去) 
strategy initiated in the new century. The narrative of 
‘going out’ was first coined by Deng in the 1980s, mainly 
for promoting trade to earn foreign currency. It was not 
until the end of the 1990s that it was formally announced 
as one of the main national strategies, and it was then 
strengthened in the new century, particularly with the 
slogan of ‘fully utilising both domestic and international 
markets and resources’ (充分利用两个市场和两种资源). 
Drivers behind the narrative
Evidently, the third narrative goes beyond agricultural 
development goals and strategies, and is actually 
motivated by China’s internal agricultural development 
challenges and opportunities within the global context. 
After more than three decades of development, China 
has gained success in raising 250m of its population out 
of absolute poverty under its national standard (The 
Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and 
Development, 2014). Cereal production and farmers’ 
incomes have also seen great enhancement. However, 
other fundamental changes in China have impacted on 
its agricultural development. On the one hand, 
consumption patterns have shifted dramatically with an 
increasing middle class, while on the other, a decrease 
in fertile lands has accompanied rapid industrialisation 
and urbanisation over the last few decades. To this can 
be added land degradation and water pollution due to 
heavy utilisation of petroleum-derived fertilisers and 
pesticides. According to published data from the Ministry 
of Lands and Resources, almost 30 percent of arable lands 
have been polluted (Lin 2014).
Therefore, despite achievements in raising domestic 
production in agriculture, food security is again becoming 
an area of great concern for China. The ‘going out’ strategy 
thus encourages Chinese firms, including agricultural 
parastatals and companies, to invest abroad to increase 
global food supply and balance the global markets, thus 
ultimately improving Chinese food security. With the new 
trends, China has become a major importer of food since 
2005, and in 2010 China led the region with its import 
share of 44 percent of the world’s commercial soybeans, 
35 percent of the world’s commercial cotton, 20 percent 
of the world’s commercial palm oil and 2.5 percent of 
the world’s rice (Alden 2013). 
The second driver underpinning the narrative of 
seeking development sustainability via PPP came from 
China’s evaluation of the global business regime. China 
is the only country so far without globally competitive 
corporations in its rising (Nolan 2012). With international 
agribusiness giants such as Cargill and ADM from the 
USA, Bunge from the Netherlands and Louise Dreyfus 
from France dominating the global agribusiness regime, 
China decided to find a solution to foster and train its 
own business champions overseas along with aid efforts 
with the principle of ‘win-win’ (双赢) in south-south 
cooperation. Obviously, when China talks about 
development sustainability, it not only refers to African 
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countries’ development but to China’s own progress as 
well. The mutual benefit is believed to be sustainable in 
the long run of CAAC for both sides.
Strategies underpinning the narrative
China’s internal reform is a process of diversifying social 
actors to stimulate divergent agencies for development. 
Cooperation, particularly between public and private 
actors, underpins the developmental state in China. There 
were no private spaces or business units before the 
reform. In Mao’s era, social organisation was dominated 
by the SOEs, work units (单位) in the cities and communes 
in the villages. With annual plans and quotas delivered 
from the state, and the production inputs and outputs 
of the SOEs, for instance, manipulated by the government, 
individual workers or farmers did not have much space 
to manoeuvre for their own benefit or innovation (Xu et 
al. 2014). However, with the gradual reform since the end 
of the 1970s, a more flexible, dynamic and diversified 
private sector and social system have been established. 
Economic development has become the new focus for 
the whole nation from the macro level down to 
individuals. The participation of private actors such as 
enterprises was promoted to develop increasing 
engagement in public project construction, particularly 
in the infrastructure building area, or provision of public 
services, such as agricultural extension. 
For instance, China’s market-oriented reform of its 
research and extension system aimed to promote the 
sensitivity of the system to the needs of small farmers 
and agricultural enterprises by distributing public 
support funds via competition grants and focused 
research programs which started in the mid-1980s. The 
policy also encouraged researchers and extensionists to 
commercialise their research products and extension 
services, particularly for those easily translated into 
business opportunities such as seeds, fertiliser and 
machines, allowing them to retain profits and reinvest 
in their follow-up activities (Huang and Hu 2004). The 
reforms not only streamlined staffing and cut the excess 
burdens of the stagnant system, but also injected client-
oriented market ideology and mechanisms into the 
system, as well as created a large group of agricultural 
institutes-cum-enterprises boasting technology 
production and extension capacities. 
Aside from the strategies underpinning PPP in the 
reform trajectory, China’s increasing engagement in 
globalisation also created huge momentum for 
formulating strategies and measures to meet the need 
to unify overseas resources and markets. With China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization the primary 
‘bringing in’ (迎进来) policy reached its peak. China has 
been essentially integrated into the new global regime. 
Thereafter, China’s agricultural development was 
increasingly influenced by global market. For instance, 
the newly issued ‘No.1 Document’ in 2015(CPC and State 
Council 2015)indicated that China’s agricultural 
development is facing ‘double pressure’ (双重挤压), i.e. 
internally with increasing production costs and externally 
with comparatively higher price disadvantages. 
Therefore, the food security strategy was redefined in 
the new context by promoting appropriate import.
Implications for CAAC
In the new century, China has dramatically increased 
its presence in African countries via aid, trade and 
investment links with the principle of ‘common 
development’ (共同发展) or ‘win-win’ under the South-
South cooperation framework. This continues alongside 
the key issues accumulated in previous generations, such 
as food security in nation building and productivity 
enhancement via S&T. However, it has also adopted the 
new element of PPP which is typically represented in the 
ATDC scheme starting in 2009. The scheme combines 
elements such as infrastructure construction, cross-
border technology transfer, capacity building and 
partnership with business profit-seeking. The physical 
buildings have so far been constructed in 23 African 
countries. The details vary in different countries, but the 
operation of the ATDCs is basically divided into three 
stages: one to two years of infrastructure construction, 
three years of technical cooperation, followed by a 
sustainable development stage. The most prominent 
feature of this modality is the mandate of the company 
in delivering aid. With the Chinese government providing 
financial support to the infrastructure construction and 
technical cooperation, combining to a total investment 
of US$5-6m for each centre, the undertaking companies 
are expected to explore resources themselves to provide 
the public goods of training, demonstration and 
extension to African countries after the technical 
cooperation period is completed.
From the above description of the ATDCs, the nature 
of PPP is deeply rooted in the design and operation of 
the technology transfer scheme. Chinese policymakers 
believe that PPP could serve as an effective instrument 
in pursuing aid sustainability. For instance, Wei Jianguo, 
the key person in ATDC design as the former vice minister 
of the Ministry of Commerce, wrote:
Is existing international aid able to solve the food 
insecurity problem in Africa? According to my 
36 years of observation based on China-Africa 
economic and trade cooperation work, I would 
conclude, ‘Absolutely Not!’ ... Alternatively, I am 
assuming the ATDC is the best model to deliver 
Chinese agricultural technology to stimulate the 
local development.... First the state can provide 
aid funds to support the centre for several years, 
then the company should operate with autonomy 
via individual business or joint ventures. The seeds, 
fertiliser, as well as experts can be supported in some 
way for some certain years until the centre reaches 
long stable sustainable development. (Wei 2011: 
227, 232)
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The aid-business nexus, coded as ‘the government sets 
the stage and the enterprises play the drama’ (政府搭
台，企业唱戏 ), is expected to work better in 
underpinning sustainable ATDC operation due to the 
nature of agricultural development and South-South 
cooperation. As highlighted by Wei,
Firstly, agricultural investment is characterised 
with high risks, but heavy investment with long 
payback term (therefore it is hard to attract private 
investment particularly at early stage). So the pilot 
(of investment) is necessary before extension 
(creating more business opportunities in Africa). 
Once the actual benefits are presented with 
experiences being accumulated (via ATDCs), the big 
scale of China-Africa agricultural cooperation can be 
carried out. Secondly, ATDC is an appropriate model 
to make the best use of our limited aid finance. It can 
extend our agricultural development experiences 
and technologies at biggest scale with less money. 
(Wei 2011: 234)
The confidence in ATDCs to solve the above dilemma, 
i.e. using limited resources to promote sustainable 
agricultural aid, arose from China’s internal developmental 
state construction experiences. The pilot also reflects 
China’s innovative solution to promote the construction 
of a new global business system which is more balanced, 
pro-poor and mutually beneficial, i.e., a ‘harmonious 
world’ broadly.
Conclusion
This paper historically reviews China’s internal 
agricultural development trajectory with an analysis 
framework of narratives, drivers and strategies, and 
discusses the implications of these narratives to CAAC 
principles and modalities in different stages. Generally, 
it examines what has historically driven agriculture 
development in China through different periods; what 
the state narratives have been about; and how these 
narratives and associated political ideologies and 
interests, and with them images of the Chinese state, 
have been built into its development cooperation efforts 
both explicitly and implicitly. It brings in a rich and critical 
analysis of changing interests, politics and state ideology 
in relation to agriculture, both at home and abroad. 
Specifically, three streams of narratives are identified: 
promotion of food security for state building in the 
post-war landscape; productivity enhancement in 
technocratic modernisation; and promoting aid 
sustainability with business engagement in the new era 
of globalisation. Through revealing the drivers behind 
these narratives and the strategies underpinning them, 
three elements are summarised to wrap up CAAC through 
the last 50 years: state leadership, productivity-centrism, 
and the government-business nexus. 
The paper identified the three key elements as 
examples of technocratic rationality penetrating China’s 
internal agricultural governing regime, which have taken 
shape particularly in the last three decades of its 
development trajectory, but which have been entrenched 
in China’s agricultural aid to African countries for the past 
50 years. Chinese perceptions of African agricultural 
development pitfalls and opportunities are based on its 
own development trajectory, as are the solutions: to 
improve the national food security of African countries 
for independent state building; to put productivity 
enhancement and economic development as the 
priorities in modernisation; and to create synergies 
between the public and private sectors to foster a 
developmental state. The emergence of ATDCs in the 
new century consummates this travelling technocratic 
rationality from China to African countries via an 
evidence-based learning process and a pragmatic 
approach. 
China’s travelling technocratic rationality differentiates 
the country’s aid, focusing on developmental state 
building, from the established aid consensus that marries 
orthodox neoliberalism with a new institutionalism 
(Mosse 2011: 4). Typically, the established aid emphasises 
institution-building for good governance, particularly 
for smooth operation of market mechanisms. China’s 
travelling technocratic rationality stresses more the 
technical solutions to development issues. With the 
principle of non-intervention and no strings attached, 
China’s aid avoids imposing or transferring institution-
building in African countries. However, during the 
implementation of China’s aid policies and practices, it 
not only delivers specific technologies to the African 
continent but also unconsciously transmits a technocratic 
development ideology in a way which does not appear 
well planned or organised. This ideology prioritises 
productivity improvement and economic development 
via technological solutions in the development sequence, 
and emphasises the role of the governments of African 
countries in organising and promoting its own 
development, and particularly in coordinating the 
relationship with business in the development process. 
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